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ENFORCING COURTESY: DEFAULT
JUDGMENTS AND THE CIVILITY MOVEMENT
Adam Owen Glist
"We have much less of a sense of shared values than we used to
have. There was a common understanding of how you acted. You
zealously represented your client, but you had respect for the other
side and treated them with dignity. Afterward, you'd all go out for a
drink." Can we ever again achieve this level of professionalism? I
hope so.'
INTRODUCTION

Calls for more civility in the legal profession multiplied over the last
decade or more.2 Although concern over a "crisis in professionalism"
may be a perpetual refrain of the bar,' an array of jurisdictions-local
1. Stephen C. Rice, President's Message.: We Need to Come Together as a

Profession, Advocate (Idaho), Jan. 1998, at 4, 4 (quoting Dean Haynsworth of

William Mitchell College of Law); see also John Gibeaut, Nourishing the Profession:
Report on Professionalism Callsfor Ethics Training, Civility Rules in Court,A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1997, at 92, 92 (quoting same from Dean Haynsworth). This quaint description
of lawyer fraternization, like so many other clichns, may originate with Shakespeare.
See Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28 Val. U.
L. Rev. 531, 531 (1994) (quoting from The Taming of the Shrevw. "And db as
adversaries do in law, strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends."); see also Daniel J.
Pope & Helen Whatley Pope, "Take Care of Each Other", 63 Def. Courts. J. 270,270
(1996) ("They regularly fought with one another in court ... but just as regularly, they
walked off arm in arm to share a beer and a good story.").
2 See Dickson & Jackson, supra note 1, at 537 n.49 (identifying codes from 24
states enacted in the late 1980s and early 1990s); Sarah Diane McShea, Taking and
Defending Depositions:Special Ethical Issues, 611 PLI/Lit 59, 61 (1999) ("Civility, as
you hear at least once a week, ought to be one of the legal profession's primary
concerns."); James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and MoralSeismography, 32 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 781, 782 (1997) ("Professionalism creeds are sweeping the nation.");
John Stuart Smith, Civility in the Courtroom fron a Litigator'sPerspective, N.Y. St.
BJ., May/June 1997, at 28, 28 (noting that 23 state bars have adopted civility codes);
see also Clarence Thomas, A Return to Civility, 33 Tulsa LJ. 7, 11 (1997) (noting
decline of civility in sports, politics, and academia, resulting in part from a view of the
law as a tool for social and political change); Gary L Johnson, Role, Ritual and
Civility in Litigation, Utah B.J., Apr. 1999, at 12, 12-15 (calling for civility and
increased attention to "ritual behavior").
3. See Moliterno, supra note 2, at 781 (quoting similar-sounding alarm calls from
the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries); see also Marvin E. Aspen, What
We Can Do about the Erosion of Civility in Litigation, Judges' J., Fall 1996, at 32, 32

(quoting from Dean Roscoe Pound's address to the American Bar Association in
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bar associations, states, and federal circuits-swiftly adopted civility
codes, standards, and creeds.'
Civility codes are aimed at a range of conduct thought to be at the
root of growing lawyer dissatisfaction and diminishing public
prestige.5 They seek to combat abuses that threaten to permeate civil
litigation: lawyers who engage in obstreperous deposition tactics,
conduct discovery calculated to harass, become obstinate over
scheduling matters, or are quick to falsely accuse their adversaries of
impropriety. Civility codes also aim at more basic failures: lawyers
who fail to cooperate, act honestly, behave politely, or keep promises.'
Many of these simple pleas for increased civility might seem
difficult to resist.' The "professionalism crusade" is not without its
detractors, however,8 and few disagree that "civility" is difficult to
define.' Nor are concerns about civility limited to the legal profession.
1906); Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, The Role of Civility in Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C.
L. Rev. 573, 573 n.4 (1999) (citing cases concerning incivility dating from 1887).
4. See infra Part II.B. The array may be illustrated by a few cross-adopted codes.
See, e.g., Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284,
287-88 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (sitting en banc to adopt mandatory "standards of litigation
conduct" for the district, adapted from the Dallas Bar Association "Guidelines of
Professional Courtesy" and "Lawyer's Creed"); D.N.J. R. app. R (appending ABA
Section of Litigation, Guidelinesfor Litigation Conduct, to local rules for the district);
D.N.M. Civ. R. 83.9 ("Lawyers appearing in this District must comply with 'A
Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism of the State Bar of New Mexico."').
5. See ABA Sec. of Litig., Guidelines for Litigation Conduct, Introduction,
Lawyers' Duties to Other Counsel (Aug. 1998) at http://www.abanet.org/
dispute/lawcivil.html [hereinafter ABA Guidelines];infra Part II.B.
6. See Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh FederalJudicial
Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371, 414 (1992). The Committee proposed adopting "Standards
for Professional Conduct" such as, "When we reach an oral understanding on a
proposed agreement or a stipulation and decide to commit it to writing, the drafter
will endeavor in good . faith to state the oral understanding accurately and
completely." Id. at 417.
7. E.g. ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at Lawyers' Duties to Other Counsel, No.
16 ("We will promptly notify other counsel and, if appropriate, the court or other
persons, when hearings, depositions, meetings, or conferences are to be canceled or
postponed."); see discussion infra Part II.B.
8. See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism
Crusade, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 259, 263 (1995) (providing "sympathetic" critique of
movement); Phillip A. Wittmann, MCLE Requirement in Professionalism? Should
"Professionalism"Be Mandatory? Can Civility Be Taught?, La. B.J., June 1997, at 19,
22-23 (arguing that professionalism is hard to define and cannot be taught, stating,
"you know it when you see it-sometimes"); Kathleen P. Browe, Comment, A
Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will Not Go Away, 77 Marq. L. Rev.
751, 765-79 (1994) (providing general critique of the civility movement's assumptions
and proposed solutions); Brenda Smith, Comment, Civility Codes: The Newest
Weapons in the 'Civil' War over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their
Mark. 24 U. Dayton L. Rev. 151, 152-53 (1998) (arguing that civility codes do not
achieve their stated aims).
9. Bruce A. Green, The Ten Most Common Ethical Violations, Litig., 48, 48
(1998) (noting that despite the attention devoted to the subject, the definition of
civility may yet be unclear); Monroe Freedman, Civility Runs Amok, Legal Times,
Aug. 14, 1995, at 54 ("Everyone is for civility and courtesy, but everyone is defining
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The term, little analyzed, is invoked by the political left, right, and

center. 10
Critics of the movement in the legal profession object that civility
codes add a confusing layer of responsibility to existing, underenforced disciplinary rules." Others argue that the notion of civility
looks to a by-gone era that either did not exist, or should not: "a
happily lost past."' This critique recalls that, even in the "good old
days," the treatment of lawyers from outside of one's "practice
those terms differently."); Smith, supra note 2, at 28 ("[C]ivility, like beauty, may be
in the eye of the beholder .... ).
10. See generally Melinda Henneberger, Bradley's Most Influential Adviser?
Bradley, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2000, at Al (quoting the former Democratic
presidential candidate as saying, "I want to run a campaign as an extension of the way
I want to govern, to restore trust and bring back civility"); American Renaissance, at
http://www.amren.com/pen-logo.htm (last modified Feb. 16, 2000) (arguing against
immigration and aiming to preserve an American white majority and publishing "[a]
literate, undeceived journal of race, immigration, and the decline of civility");
Americans for More Civility, at http'//vww.morecivility.com (last modified Apr. 20,
2000) (urging that people, inter alia, "[s]mile more and complain less"); Center for
Communication and Social Policy: Civility Project & Clearinghouse, at
http'//www.ccsp.ucsb.edu/civil.htm (last modified July 7, 1999) (describing Civility
Project at the University of California, Santa Barbara, engaged in conducting, among
other things, "a content analysis measuring civility in public affairs talk and interview
shows [to measure], e.g., the rate of interruptions and the use of ad hominum
argumentation"); The Interfaith Alliance, Civility.net-Affirming the Need for Greater
Civility in Society, at http'./www.civility.net (last modified Jan. 24, 2000) (urging fairer
and more polite conduct from candidates for office, as well as an end to hate speech);
Randall Kennedy, State of the Debate: The Case Against 'Civility', 41 Am. Prospect
Online
1-4 (Nov.-Dec. 1998), at http'/wwwv.prospect.orglarchives/41/41kenn.html
(arguing that the larger movement for civility is confused and reactionary).
11. See Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney be Required to Advise a Client of
ADR Options?, 13 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 427, 453 (2000) ("In practice, civility codes
can cause confusion among the judiciary and the practicing bar, because it is not
always clear when mandatory rules of professional conduct, as opposed to
'aspirational' statements of ideal conduct, are being applied."); Mary C. Daly, The
Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the
Differences in Perceptionsof Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers,
32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1117, 1127 (1999) ("Lawyer discipline in the United States
has always been an embarrassment.")
12. Moliterno, supra note 2, at 808-14. See generally Amy R. Mashburn,
Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 Val. U. L
Rev. 657, 664 (1994) (criticizing civility codes as a "patrician reaction" to the
increased pluralism of the bar). For examples of such nostalgia, see Sol Wachtler,
Law Day '90: Yes, Jessica, There are 'Good' and 'Bad' Lawyers, N.Y. L.J., May 1,
1990, at 37, 37, who notes that "lawyers are employing tactics that would have been
unthinkable a generation ago," and Pope & Pope, supra note 1, at 270-71, who
compare the declining collegiality among lawyers with the increased cooperation in
professional sports. Some civility advocates appear to long for an even earlier era, as
well as an entirely different culture. See, e.g., Mashburn, supra, at 695 (calling the
allusions that civility promoters make to the English system "ironic" as that system is
rigidly class-bound); Dennis Turner & Solomon Fulero, Can Civility Return to the
Courtroom? Will American Jurors Like It?, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 131, 134, 169 (1997)
(studying how American juries react to trials conducted in a more "civil atmosphere"
by British barristers, and finding that although juries rated the British style more civil,
they preferred the American).
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Thus, to the extent that the warm

memory of collegiality promoted by civility codes14 is not entirely
imagined, social cohesion was achieved through force of exclusion by
race, class, and gender.15
Finally, other commentators find the duties imposed by civility
codes at odds with the lawyer's duty of zealous advocacy to the
client. 16 Promoters of civility have deemed one cause of incivility
"overzealous advocates [who] seem to think the zeal and effectiveness
of a lawyer depends on how thoroughly he can disrupt the
proceedings or how loud he can shout."'"
This Note closely examines one feature of many civility codes that
illustrates aspects of each of these critiques: the prohibition of seeking
13. See Moliterno, supra note 2, at 810.
14. See, e.g., Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988). The Dondi court declared:
We address today a problem that, though of relatively recent origin, is so
pernicious that it threatens to delay the administration of justice and to place
litigation beyond the financial reach of litigants.... As judges and former
practitioners from varied backgrounds and levels of experience, we judicially
know that litigation is conducted today in a manner far different from years
past. Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the
legal profession has become only a business, or experienced lawyers have
ceased to teach new lawyers the standards to be observed, or because of
other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior that
forebode ill for our system of justice.
Id.
15. See Mashburn, supra note 12, at 666, 672-73; Molitemo, supra note 2, at 80910. The American Bar Association, for example, did not officially admit black
lawyers until 1943. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 1.4.2, at 10
(1986); see also Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice 40-73 (1976) (describing the
maintenance of class differences among "the stratified profession"); Jerome E. Carlin,
Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar 176-82 (1966) (documenting
significant social stratification of the bar based on class, ethnicity, and other
differences). Professor Carlin suggests that social distance "deprofessionalizes" nonelite lawyers, inhibits reform, and restricts access to high quality legal services. Id.
For an example of nostalgia imbued with implicit, unspoken issues of race, see
Charles H. Wilson, Planes, Trains and... Civility, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 77, 77. Mr.
Wilson tells a story from a time before air travel was common, and the Arkansas legal
community was concentrated in Little Rock. Id. A Little Rock judge sat in Hot
Springs every other Tuesday. On Monday afternoon, the judge and an entourage of
lawyers would ride the same train from Little Rock, board at the same rooming
house, and dine together in Hot Springs. The next day, after a court calendar
complete with adversarial proceedings, the group would return to Little Rock
together on the afternoon train. Id. While Mr. Wilson imagines the increased
courtesy and civility that might result from such an arrangement, he fails to consider,
in this story of public conveyance and accommodation, that Arkansas was most likely
segregated at the time.
16. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 9, at 54 ("And one of the principal casualties
of these managerial judges [who enforce voluntary codes] is the American lawyer's
traditional ethic of zealous representation."); see infra Part II.B.
17. Marvin E. Aspen, A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 253,
253 (1998) (quoting Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 213
(1971)).
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default judgments against a known attorney adversary." Hesitating
before seeking a default judgment is part of the "professional
courtesy" which drafters of civility codes seek to revive.1 9 Professional
courtesy dictates that before taking steps to obtain a default judgment,
attorneys should provide other attorneys with extra notice above what
is required by the procedural rules. With the prohibition against
defaults, civility codes pit prized, incremental advantage against
loyalty to professional colleagues. That advantage may be fleeting, if
not self-defeating. Nonetheless, there may be times when the best
course includes obliging one's adversary to first appear before the
court asking to set aside a default due to "excusable neglect."'
Part I of this Note describes the mechanics of the law of default
judgments, how they are entered and the competing policies they
implicate. Part II explores attempts to regulate defaults in cases and
civility codes. Then, the part traces the origins of "professional
courtesy" and its requirements from the Canons of Professional Ethics
set out at the turn of the last century through the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Part ImI argues that there are more effective ways to stop attorneys
from seeking defaults they ought not seek. Part III first analyzes cases
that have set aside defaults under increasingly liberal legal standards,
without any reference to ethical ones. This part concludes that
regulating defaults is ill-advised in light of superior methods to
encourage better behavior, including liberal interpretation of existing
law and the enactment of clear procedural rules that simply prohibit
the defaults without notice that civility promoters lament. The result
reduces potential interference with zealous advocacy, and frees the
organized bar to better enforce existing disciplinary rules and address
18. See, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct, § 13(b)
(1994),
available
at
http//vv.actl.com/home/publications-by-date/

code_of_trial_conductcode_of_trial_conduct.html. Section 13(b) provides: "When a
lawyer knows the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, the lawyer
should not take advantage of the opposing lawyer by causing any default or dismissal

to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to
proceed." ld
19. Marvin E. Aspen, Let Us Be 'Officers of the Court',A.B.A. J., July 1997, at 94,
96 (quoting from the ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at Lawyers' Duties to Other
Counsel, No. 18). The ABA Guidelines provide, "We will not cause any default or

dismissal to be entered without first notifying opposing counsel, when we know his or

her identity, unless the rules provide otherwise." Id.
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see discussion infra Parts L.A, III.A.2. The theoretical
advantage may indeed be slight. See Silverman v. Polis, 326 A.2d 452, 454-55 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1974). That court condemned:

[A]ttempts to utilize every niggling procedural point for maximum

advantage [that] demean the legal profession, reducing its procedures to a

vulgar scramble. No doubt it is for this reason that in so many cases, notice

of intent to take a default judgment, or the lack thereof, is properly made a

significant factor in reaching a just decision.
Id. at 455.
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more fundamental causes of lawyer dissatisfaction. Part III concludes
that this approach-redefining "appearance" or revising procedural
rules-is the best and most modern way to balance the competing
policies of expediency and fairness implicated by default judgments.
I. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS: PROCEDURE

One practitioner recalls the words of a senior attorney in the small
western city where he first set out to practice: "[Y]ou don't default a
colleague."2 1 A retired state high court judge tells the story of a friend
rebuked rather than rewarded for promptly moving for a default
judgment in his first assignment as a law clerk for an older, wellrespected trial lawyer.2" That lawyer quickly instructed the zealous
novice, "We just don't take defaults in these circumstances."3
Another judge advises that "in theory there may be opportunity to
take a default or default judgment. Best to talk to opposing counsel,
and inquire whether some extenuating circumstance exists. '24 He
continues, "You likely will make a friend of a fellow lawyer with
whom you will be dealing for many years .... 25
When do missed deadlines signal the forfeiture of legal rights, and
when do they prompt a friendly phone call? 26 This part outlines the
21. Rice, supra note 1, at 4.
22. See Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., PreparingLaw Students and New Lawyers for the
Year 2000 and Beyond, N.Y. St. B.J., May/June 1997, at 12, 12.
23. Id. Hancock also tells of how his work on the Craco Commission, New York's
Committee on Professionalism and the Courts, made him realize that "[m]any lawyers
were either not aware of or were simply ignoring the unwritten '[w]e just don't do it
this way' code of professional conduct." Id. at 13.
24. J. Thomas Greene, Views from the Bench: How to be Effective and Contented
in the Practiceof Law, Utah B.J., Dec. 1995, at 32,35.
25. Id.
26. The extra time that should be afforded professional colleagues is in marked
contrast to the effect of defaults in other contexts. For instance, in the criminal
context, the doctrine of "procedural bar" or "procedural default" strictly limits the
evidence and arguments that may be presented on collateral appeal when not made,
or defaulted, at trial or on direct appeal. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991) ("This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a
state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent
of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment .... This rule applies
whether the state law ground is substantive or procedural." (citations omitted)); John
H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death By Default: State ProceduralDefault Doctrine
in CapitalCases, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1998) (reviewing South Carolina's "draconian"
procedural bar doctrine); William J. Bowers & Benjamin D. Steiner, Death By
Default: An Empirical Demonstration of False and Forced Choices in Capital
Sentencing, 77 Tex. L. Rev. 605, 630 (1999) (examining prohibition against providing
Georgia juries with detailed information about alternatives to death penalty, such as
life imprisonment without parole, and thereby inducing choice of "death by default");
Stephen B. Bright, Counselfor the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
But for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835, 183940 (1994) (describing death
sentences imposed in cases of egregious failures of lawyering and evidentiary
development that were impossible to correct on appeal due to procedural default).
Similarly, courts increasingly impose the sanction of default for discovery delay. See,
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mechanics of default judgment procedure-at
straightforward area of procedural law.

first glance a

A. Entry
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and many state rules
patterned after them, obtaining a default judgment is a two-step
process that begins with an entry of default."z The clerk may enter a
party's default upon "fail[ure] to plead or otherwise defend."' This
includes a defendant's failure to file any papers at all, or, after filing
an appearance, failing to file an answer.29 The language also includes
failure to answer cross- or counter claims.3' Entry of default is the
clerk's certification that process was properly served and no response
was filed.31 In a typical case, a "no-answer default,"2 the plaintiff may
seek 33entry of default after the defendant fails to answer within 20
days.
The clerk's entry of default is an interlocutory order.3 Rule 55(c)
provides that the court may set aside an entry of default "for good
cause shown." '35 Good cause is generally established by examining
three criteria: "(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether the
moving party has presented a meritorious defense; and (3) whether
setting aside the default would prejudice the party who secured the
entry of default."'
If the entry of default is not set aside, the
complaint is deemed admitted. Further, res judicata may prevent the
defendant from pressing a counterclaim.-'
B. Judgment
At any time after entry, a party may move for a judgment on the
default.' If damages are liquidated and the party has not appeared,
eg., Kihl v. Pfeffer, 722 N.E.2d 55, 58 (N.Y. 1999) (upholding dismissal for plaintiff's
delay in responding to court-ordered disclosure).
27. Fed. R.Civ. P. 55(a).

28. ld.

29. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 reporters' notes.
30. See 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2682 (3d
ed. 1998).
31. See Kenneth C. Broodo & Douglas D. Haloftis, Practicein the FederalDistrict
Courtsfrom the Law Clerk's Perspective: The Rules Behind the Rules, 43 Baylor L
Rev. 333,365 n.105 (1991).
32. Costley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 894 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994).
33. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) ("[A] defendant shall serve an
answer... within 20 days after being served with the summons and complaint ....
")
34. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 reporters' notes.
35. Fed. L Civ. P. 55(c).
36. First Interstate Bank v. Serv. Stores of Am., Inc., 128 F.1LD. 679, 680 (W.D.
Okla. 1989).
37. See id.
38. Fed. R_ Civ. P. 55(b). The rules provide that a judgment by default may not

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

the clerk may enter that judgment, without notice to the defendant or
a hearing. 9 If the party has appeared before defaulting, or if damages
are not liquidated, the court must enter the judgment, holding a
hearing if necessary.'n The decision to grant a default judgment,
notwithstanding a party's technical default, is discretionary.4' One
court found that the plaintiff-appellant "cites no case in which '4a
reviewing court reversed a failure to enter a default judgment.
Even short of a default judgment, however, if the order of default is
not set aside, a party may be prevented from defending the merits,
leaving the amount of the final judgment the only issue to be
determined.4 3 Likewise, on appeal, a court may set aside the
judgment, but not the entry of default, thereby preventing a defendant
from filing a responsive pleading.'
Rule 5(a) makes clear that "[n]o service need be made on parties in
default for failure to appear. ' 45 Asking the clerk to enter a default
does not require notice to the opposing party. 6 When proceeding to
judgment, however, a party's appearance requires notice before
application for judgment.47
Once a clerk or judge has already entered judgment by default, the
rules refer to the general rule of relief from judgment, Rule 60(b).11
This rule provides for relief due to "mistake, inadvertence, surprise"
and the like.49 Entry of default will therefore be set aside with a lesser
showing than that required for default judgment.5 0

exceed that originally sought in the action. Id. at 54(c). Of course, if the defendant
does not respond, and the plaintiff does not move for default, the action may be
dismissed for want of prosecution. Id. at 41(b); Broodo & Haloftis, supra note 31, at
364-65.

39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
40. Id. at 55(b)(2).
41. See 10A Wright et al., supra note 30, § 2685; see also SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d
732, 738 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a denial of motion to vacate default judgment is
reversed only for an abuse of discretion).
42. Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).

43. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 55 reporters' notes.
44. See Key Bank v. Tablecloth Textile Co., 74 F.3d 349, 356 n.13 (1st Cir. 1996);
Ole, Inc. v. Yariv, 566 So. 2d 812,813 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (setting aside entry of
default after trial court set aside only the default judgment).
45. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
46. Id. at 55(a).
47. Id. at 55(b)(2) (requiring 3 days notice before hearing on application for
judgment); 10A Wright et al., supra note 30, § 2684.
48. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
49. Id. at 60(b).

50. Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 918 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
concurring) (noting that the standard for setting aside an entry of default under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 55(c) is more liberal than that for setting aside a default judgment under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)); First Interstate Bank v. Serv. Stores of Am., Inc., 128 F.R.D.
679, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (same).

20001

ENFORCING COURTESY

Competing policies are at stake in the decision to set aside defaults
or default judgments.5 The mechanism of default fosters efficiency
and discourages delay by severely penalizing dilatory or
procrastinating conduct.52 Defaults protect diligent parties." The law
also favors the finality of judgments.' 4 Default judgments, of course,
bind the parties just as if the matter were contested." These
"considerations of social goals, justice and expediency"-, must be
weighed against a strong policy favoring hearing matters on their
merits, rather than according to "procedural maneuver."'' Indeed, the
development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relaxed the
historic "harshness of defaults,"58 and the "'philosophy of modem
federal procedure favors trials on the merits."' 59
As a result, entries of default and default judgments are routinely
set aside. One standard has set out that "[a]ny doubt should be
resolved in favor of setting aside a default," as long as the default was
not willful, no substantial prejudice will occur, and the defendant has a
51. See 10A Wright et al., supra note 30, § 2693.
52. See H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d
689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
53. See id.
54. See generally Ledwith v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D. 539, 544 (D. Neb. 1942) (holding
that "[tlhe vacation of a default judgment duly entered without fraud or overreaching,
is not an action which the court should take arbitrarily or as a courtesy or favor to the
losing party," and that, "even when he makes the showing [of mistake, neglect,
surprise] required by the rule, his claim to relief is not absolute," but discretionary).
55. See Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 157 U.S. 683, 691-92 (1895).
The Court explains:
It is said that the defendants did not contest; that they withdrew their
answer, and that there was only a judgment by default. But a judgment by
default is just as conclusive an adjudication between the parties of whatever
is essential to support the judgment as one rendered after answer and
contest.
The essence of estoppel by judgment is that there has been a judicial
determination of a fact, and the question always is, has there been such
determination, and not upon what evidence or by what means was it
reached. A failure to answer is taken as an admission of the truth of the
facts stated in the complaint, and the court may properly base its
determination on such admission. Suppose the defendant files a denial, and
on the trial the only evidence is the testimony of a witness to an admission
made by the defendant out of court, and upon such testimony the judgment
is rendered. Is it any the less a judicial determination because resting simply
upon proof of the defendant's admission, and yet in principle what
distinguishes that case from this? In each the judgment is resting upon an
admission of the party against whom the judgment is rendered, and does it
make any difference in what form that admission is presented to the judge?
Id.

56. Pelican Prod. Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 1970)).
57. Sun Bank v. Pelican Homestead & Say. Ass'n, 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989).
58. 10A Wright et al., supra note 30, § 2681.
59. Id.; Passarella v. Hilton Int'l Co., 810 F.2d 674, 675 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting
A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. MJ. Sales & Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40,43 (7th Cir. 1972)).
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meritorious defense.'
Under this standard, delay alone is not
substantial prejudice,61 and "even a hint of a suggestion" of proof
available at trial is enough to meet the showing of a meritorious
defense.6' Default judgments are seen as "a weapon of last, rather
than first, resort," imposed only "upon a serious showing of willful
default."'63 Most courts hold that they should be imposed "only when
the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially
unresponsive party."'

II. COURTESY AND CONDEMNATION
This part first explores several cases that condemn lawyers who
seek default judgments without notice to their adversaries. This part
then turns to the civility movement, and the codes and standards that
prohibit or foreswear the use of such defaults. Then this part looks at
early writings about professional courtesy at the outset of legal selfregulation, and the treatment of professional courtesy in modern
ethics codes.
As seen above,65 the law of default judgments appears to be
straightforward. Flexibility is built into the language of the rules,
allowing relief from entry for good cause, and from judgment for
mistake or neglect. Nonetheless, throughout the case law governing
these terms, there is a strain of judicial condemnation of some lawyers
who file for default judgments, despite their procedural availability
under the rules. "Snapping up a judgment," one court declared, "is a
practice widely condemned by this and other Courts."' How does a
simple procedural maneuver provoke such hostility, and lead judges
to anguish over the doomed profession?
A. Snap Judgments
A few cases illustrate the question. In First Interstate Bank v.
Service Stores of America, Inc., the "snapping" lawyer, above, took an
60. Morris v. Charnin, 85 F.R.D. 689, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citations omitted).
The court found that the defendant's conduct did not constitute gross neglect, and

"[f]urthermore, we are unable to find any legitimate reason for the failure of
plaintiffs counsel to inform his adversary that the action had been commenced, or
that a default on defendant's part seemed imminent." Id.
61. See, e.g., Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 916 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[I]t must be shown
that delay will result in the loss of evidence, create increased difficulties of discovery,

or provide greater opportunity for fraud and collusion." (citation omitted)).
62. Keegel v. Key W. & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372,374 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(citation omitted).
63. Davis, 713 F.2d at 916 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Sun Bank v. Pelican Homestead & Say. Assoc., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir.
1989) (quoting H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432
F.2d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).

65. See discussion supra Part I.
66. First Interstate Bank v. Serv. Stores of Am., Inc., 128 F.R.D. 679, 680 (W.D.
Okla. 1989).
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entry of default one day after the time to file an answer expired. 6
Counsel for defendant had just been retained one week earlier, and
faced both an intervening holiday (Thanksgiving) and a family
illness.68 When the defendant moved under Rule 55(c) to set aside the
entry of default, plaintiff's counsel contested. 69 The court found that
"[c]onduct of this nature only reinforces stereotypical attitudes about
the lawyer who plays 'hardball' at any cost."7
In another case, a Pennsylvania appellate court addressed the
tension between zealous advocacy and courtesy while reversing a
refusal to vacate a default.7 ' The court reversed in part for failing to
consider the negative equities presented, including plaintiff's lack of
courtesy in moving for default and failing to return phone calls or
cooperate. 72 The court declared that:
The purpose of the rules in authorizing the entry of default
judgments is to prevent a dilatory defendant from impeding the
plaintiff in establishing his claim. The rules are not primarily
intended to provide the plaintiff with a means of gaining a judgment
without the difficulties which arise from litigation.... Without the
rudimentary amount of courtesy or accession to reasonable requests,
the legal profession is demeaned and its procedures reduced to a
"vulgar scramble"
....Zeal, while admirable, must be tempered by
7

decency. 3

In Miro Tool & Manufacturing, Inc. v. Midland Machinery, a
Wisconsin appellate court reversed a trial court order reopening a
default after the one-year statutory period.74 The trial court had
vacated the default because the defendant relied on representations
that the plaintiff would not pursue the judgment. 5 While the
appellate court reversed due to a clear statutory limit on the trial
court's discretion, 76 the presiding judge wrote a lengthy concurrence to
67. Id.
6& Id.
69. Id. The court condemned this appeal of the denial to vacate as frivolous and
unprofessional. Id. at 680-81.
70. Id. at 680.
71. Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 620 A.2d 1206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). For
more on the tension between zealous advocacy and civility, see Edward M. Waller,
Jr., Professionalism"The Client May Come Second, 28 Stetson L Rev. 279, 279 n.3
(1998), who notes that the decision whether to seek a default is procedural, not
substantive, and thus is within control of the lawyer rather than the client. See also
Gulf Maint. & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 543 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (accepting the view that a decision whether to vacate a default when requested
by opposing counsel is procedural, not substantive, and thus within the control of the
attorney).
72. See Duckson, 620 A.2d at 1212.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. See Miro Tool & Mfg., Inc. v. Midland Mach., Inc., 556 N.W.2d 437,438 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1996).
75. See id.
at 438-39.
76. If the court were to find this statutory authority outweighed by the duty of
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"lament the
untimely demise of common courtesy in the legal
' 77

profession.

Counsel in Miro Tool did not "warn opposing counsel that a default
judgment would be taken."'7 8 Although the concurrence found that
counsel "cannot be faulted for complying with the technical
requirements of the Rules," the court proceeded to do just that,
despite acknowledging that Wisconsin had no reported cases on the
ethical obligation to give additional notice to opposing counsel that a
default is "close at hand. 79 The opinion identified some illustrative

support for a requirement of courtesy in California case law.80
However, that authority similarly upheld a discretionary denial of
relief, while "'decry[ing] this lack of professional courtesy."' 81
The Miro Tool concurrence quoted at length from a law review
article about civility.' Although noting that counsel's failure to notify
is not the same as calling an opponent an "asshole," 83 the presiding

professional courtesy, a small matter of the separation of powers might arise. Court
rules, as statutory commands, raise questions of separation of powers and appropriate
construction in the debate within Pioneer Investment Service Co. v. Brunswick
Associates, 507 U.S. 380 (1993). The majority concludes that "by empowering the
courts to accept late filings 'where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect'... Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would ... accept late filings

caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening
circumstances beyond the party's control." Id. at 388. The dissent warned that
"[w]hen courts depart from the language of a congressional command, they often
create unintended difficulties in the process." Id. at 409 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
77. Miro Tool, 556 N.W.2d at 440 (Anderson, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 441.
79. Id.
80. See Bellm v. Bellia, 198 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
81. Miro Tool, 556 N.W.2d at 442 (quoting Bellm, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 390).
82. See id. ("'[T]he cardinal virtues have been either taken for granted or
overlooked... [which] partially explains what others perceive as a fairly pervasive
breakdown in contemporary legal professionalism."' (quoting Mark Neal Aaronson,
Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Civility, Moral Character, and
Professionalism,8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 113, 118 (1995))). Reliance on this scholarship
may be misplaced. Professor Aaronson hopes to move discourse about civility
beyond "superficial," "behavioral" standards that lack "moral suasion"-such as,
perhaps, the prescription to provide extra notice to colleagues-to a deeper level
rooted in the classical sense of civility as good citizenship. Aaronson, supra,at 115-17.
83. Miro Tool, 556 N.W.2d at 442. In light of the rather dry procedural issue at
stake in this case, the court's use of profanity, sua sponte, may belie a contamination
by the coarseness it purports to reject. A similar process may be at work in others
who write about civility and, who oddly, almost pruriently, repeat, at length, the
violation of the norm. See, e.g., John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's
Fatal Flaws, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 505, 583 (2000) (noting extensive publicity and
reproducing the outrageous deposition conduct in Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)); A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and
Ethics of Civil Depositions,57 Md. L. Rev. 273, 295, nn.114-23 (1998) (quoting from
and repeating same). A Westlaw search shows 20 articles that quote the more graphic
moments of this deposition. Search of Westlaw, TP-ALL database (Sept. 10, 2000)
(search for "gag /3 maggot").
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judge found the behavior nonetheless "symptomatic of the decline of
civility in the legal profession."
The Supreme Court of Alaska, in Valdez v. Salonon, accepted a
provision of the American College of Trial Lawyer's Code of Trial
Conduct that prohibits taking defaults without additional notice.'
The Alaska court cited this provision, as well as the Code of
Professional Responsibility's mandate to follow customs of courtesy,
in reversing a trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment.'
The plaintiff in Salomon had received a letter from the city attorney
asking to be notified if the city's insurer did not appear, in order to
avoid default.Y The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to
rely on the defendant for notice.m1
Later, in Cox v. Nasche,89 the Alaska federal district court
sanctioned the plaintiff's attorneys for resisting a motion to vacate a
default that had been entered without noticef0 The court, referring to
the lawyers by pseudonyms to protect them from further public
censure, ordered the lawyers to pay attorney fees for their
"unnecessary motions or unwarranted opposition to motions."91
Plaintiff's lawyers had a default entered shortly after the defendants
removed the case to federal court, clearly signaling their intention to
defend. 2 Attorneys Doe and Roe proceeded to vigorously resist the
defendant's motion to set aside the default, claiming that "substantial
attorney's fees and costs have been incurred in moving for entry of
default and default judgment."9
The attorneys unsuccessfully
defended against the court's sanction by asserting that zealous
advocacy, and even fear of malpractice, motivated their conduct,
The court reiterated that the purpose of default is to "prevent a
procrastinating defendant from unduly delaying a case," and that the
lawyers proceeded in bad faith and with "no hope of success." The
court nonetheless noted that it does "not impose sanctions
84. Miro Tool, 556 N.W.2d at 442.
85. See Valdez v. Salomon, 637 P.2d 298, 299 (Alaska 1981). Provision 14(a) of
the Code (1971-72) provided that "[w]hen [a lawyer] knows the identity of a lawyer
representing an opposing party, he should not take advantage of the lawyer by
causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the
opposing lawyer's intention to proceed." Id.
86. See id. at 299 n.1; Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-38, DR 7106(C)(5) (1983).
87. Salomon, 637 P.2d at 298-99.
88. Id at 299; see also Nev. Indus. Guar. Co. v. Sturgeon, 391 P.2d 862, 864 (Nev.
1964) (Thompson, J., concurring) (warning that "silence may lead opposing counsel to
rely upon an assumption that professional standards will be followed").
89. 149 F.R.D. 190 (D. Alaska 1993).
90. Id. at 191.
91. Id.
92- Id.

93. Id at 192.
94. Id. at 193.
95. Id. at 192 (citing Valdez v. Salomon, 637 P.2d 298 (Alaska 1981)).
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regularly, ' 96 and found that "incivil attorneys are far fewer97than public
fears might suggest and adverse publicity might indicate."
These cases display the application of largely unwritten rules 98 to
sanction procedural tactics viable on their face. While it is difficult to
defend the tactics criticized in these cases, it is easier to discern that
discourtesy is not at all the most serious misconduct at issue. The
results may have been clearer and more powerful if the lawyer in First
Interstate Bank faced sanctions for frivolously contesting the order
vacating entry of default; the lawyers in Miro Tool and Salomon, for
deceiving opposing counsel. 99
In fact, the court in Cox follows such an alternative path, steering
clear of ethical and customary precepts, by necessity.10 Since the
District of Alaska had not adopted the Alaska Code of Professional
Responsibility by local rule, the court made it clear that it was "not
sanctioning Doe for failure to give notice before seeking the entry of
default... [and was] not adopting the rule of Salomon by court
decision and then applying it retroactively.' 101 Instead, the court used
an array of authority that included its inherent power, Rule 11, and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 to sanction Doe and Roe.10
B. Civility Codes
The civility movement is commonly dated to 1971, to remarks by
then Chief Justice Warren Burger." 3 Reacting to the roiling political
passions of that era, Burger told the opening session of the annual
American Law Institute meeting:
With passing time I am developing a deep conviction as to the
necessity for civility if we are to keep the jungle from closing in on
us and taking over all that the hand and brain of Man has created in
thousands of years, by way of rational discourse and
in deliberative
1
processes, including the trial of cases in the courts. 0
Burger reiterated his concern about a decline in professionalism at
the mid-year meeting of the American Bar Association in 1984, and
his call for a study group on the issue led to the ABA Commission on
Professionalism report, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprintfor
96. Id. at 197.
97. Id. at 194.
98. See Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures,
and ClinicalLegal Education, 6 Clinical L. Rev. 127, 154 (1999).
99. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing for
liability for costs incurred by an attorney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously").
100. Cox, 149 F.R.D. at 192 n.2.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Aspen, supra note 17, at 254; Smith, supra note 2, at 28.
104. Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211,212 (1971).
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5 The report observed the
the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism."
move from the Canons of Professional Ethics, aspirational statements
that relied on the rough outlines of a "not-too-demanding
conscience," to the more demanding Model Rules, noting that lawyers
"tend to look at nothing but the rules.""' ' The report encouraged
local bar associations to draft creeds of professionalism10'

A significant development in the ensuing creation of these gapfilling codes was the Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh

Federal Judicial Circui. 1

The Committee, headed by Chief Judge

Marvin E. Aspen of the Northern District of Illinois, proposed
"Standards for Professional Conduct" that have been widely
adopted. 1 9 Drawing on sources including the American College of
Trial Lawyers Code of Trial Conduct, the ABA adopted the
Standards in 1998, with little modification, as "proven aspirational
standards.""'3
In an article addressed in part to Monroe Freedman and other
"civility naysayers," Judge Aspen defended civility codes against
105. 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986); see Moliterno, supra note 2, at 795 (citing Mid-Year
Meeting of A.B.A., 52 U.S.L.W. 2471, 2471 (1984)); see also Warren E. Burger, The
Decline of Professionalism, 63 Fordham L Rev. 949, 953 (1995) (decrying "Rambo"
lawyers and noting that "[c]ivility is imperative in the courtroom ... [and] an essential
element of the fair administration of justice").
106. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism, In the Spirit of Public Service: A Blueprint
for the Rekindlingof Lawyer Professionalism,112 F.R.D. at 259.
107. Id. at 296-97. The report recommended "all segments of the bar" should:
Resolve to abide by higher standards of conduct than the minimum required
by the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.
Surely, it is not too much to call on the American Bar Association and its
members to reach for such a goal. The minimum standards are important,
indeed essential, to uphold; but leadership, example and inspiration are
needed as well. We call on the American Bar Association to provide the
leadership and the example, which in turn will provide the inspiration.
Id. Professor Moliterno has remarked on the circularity of this return to earlier,
pre-regulatory writings about professionalism. See Moliterno, supra note 2, at 796
(citing, e.g., David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study (1836)).
108. 143 F.R.D. 371,414 (1992); see Aspen supra note 17, at 254. A more thorough
analysis of this history might identify Judge Aspen as a prime "marketer" of civility.
One commentator has written that "[c]rises in the profession do not just happen; they
are 'created' and marketed by particular segments of the bar." Austin Sarat,
Enactments of Professionalism:A Study of Judges' and Laivyers' Accounts of Ethics
and Civility in Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 809, 809-10 (1998).
109. See, e.g., D.NJ. R. app. R (adding to local rules the Guidelinesfor Litigation
Conduct, including the duty not to seek a default against against a known attorney
adversary); N.D. Ind. R. app. B (appending Standards for Professional Conduct);
E.D. Mich. R Civility Principles (same).
110. See Code of Trial Conduct, supra note 18; ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at
Introduction. The Seventh Circuit Committee noted that "the majority of the survey
respondents did not rank such a code at the top of their recommended solutions," but
"the Committee determined that a specification of civility expectations and
commitments would be very useful." Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of
the Seventh FederalJudicialCircuit,143 F.R1D. 371,417 (1992).
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claims that they inhibit zealous representation and inevitably will be

enforced rather than remain aspirational. 111 To do so, Judge Aspen
reviewed several cases citing the Standards, including one concerning
the improper entry of default."1 In Vlotho v. Hardin County, the
defendant county obtained a default on a counterclaim against the
plaintiff, a contractor who had destroyed an historic bridge.1 13 The
court found that it could not "ignore the manner in which this default
was taken."1"

4

The court cited the Seventh Circuit's Standard

providing that "[w]e will not cause any default or dismissal to be
entered without first notifying opposing counsel.""' 5 In his article,
Judge Aspen applauds the court, which found that the default was
clearly improper because a clerk may not enter defaults on
counterclaims.116 Judge Aspen called the county "underhanded," in
its ex parte and improper application to the clerk.'17 The move may
have been aggressive, but it is hard to deem it evil; the same maneuver
would have been allowed under the rules in federal court." 8
This demonstrates another problem that inhibits the efficacy of
civility codes-their patchwork application across jurisdictions. One
example is the disclaimer added by the ABA Section of Litigation
version of the Seventh Circuit's Standards. The ABA version
111. Aspen, supra note 17, at 256-57. Professor Freedman has written extensively
about, and, on behalf of, the adversary system. See Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers'
Ethics in an Adversary System viii-ix (1975); Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding
Lawyers' Ethics 13-42 (1990); Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalismin the American
Adversary System, 41 Emory L.J. 467, 470 (1992) (defining professionalism as
including the obligation to "zealously and competently use all lawful means to protect
and advance the client's lawful interests"). Judge Aspen notes that Freedman
counted the adoption of over 100 civility codes in Monroe Freedman, Civility Runs
Amok, Legal Times, Aug. 14, 1995, at 14. Aspen, supra note 17, at 257.
Those concerned about the inappropriate judicial enforcement of civility may take
comfort in a recent Second Circuit decision overturning lower court sanctions against
an incivil attorney. Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, 221 F.3d 71, 71 (2d Cir. 2000). The
district court imposed a $50,000 sanction against an attorney for a course of abusive
conduct which included threatening his adversary with "the legal equivalent of a
proctology exam" unless he immediately settled. Id. at 73, 75. The district court relied
on its inherent power and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994), but referred to the larger problem
of civility in litigation in what the appeals court called a "lengthy discussion" of the
issue. Id. at 77. While the court of appeals did note "the general decline in the
decorum level of even polite public discourse," the court oddly mused that the
attorney's remark would not have garnered such attention if it had referenced an
MRI or a CAT scan, and concluded that, though some of the conduct lacked "grace
and civility," none of it was sanctionable. Id. at 79.
112. See Vlotho v. Hardin County, 509 N.W.2d 350 (Iowa 1993).
113. See id. at 351.
114. Id. at 352.
115. Id. at 353. In 1996, the Iowa Supreme Court followed that state's bar
association and adopted the Seventh Circuit's Standards for Professional Conduct,
with two slight additions. See Iowa Standards for Prof'1 Conduct.
116. See Vlotho, 509 N.W.2d at 353; see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 230-31 (providing that
clerk may enter default, but not on counterclaims).
117. See Aspen, supra note 17, at 261.
118. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (d); supra Part I.
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promises not to enter a default "without first notifying opposing
counsel, when we know his or her identity, unless the rules provide
otherwise. 119 Of course, a guideline is only needed when procedural
rules do provide otherwise. If the rules prohibit entry without notice,
no guideline is necessary. The standard has been revised to a nullity.
C. Early Writings on ProfessionalCourtesy

Early writings on the nature and content of professional courtesy
are instructive. A number of contemporary writers carelessly use the
phrase as synonymous with "common courtesy."'2
Professional
courtesy was traditionally conceived as governing matters "[a]side
from the conventional rules that regulate the conduct of gentlemen
between themselves.., which arise out of... and are peculiar to the
attorney's office. ' ' 21 Professional courtesy focuses on relations within
the profession, and is not extended to lay people.'
Today,
professional courtesy applies narrowly to contexts such as initial
default judgments and cooperation over scheduling matters."z At one
time, however, professional courtesy dictated that lawyers not charge
one another for services.1 4
George Warvelle, an early commentator, described the courtesies
primarily as scheduling accommodations, favors that ought to be
granted, but noted that "no ethical obligation requires it."'

He

119. ABA Guidelines, supra note 5, at Lawyers' Duties to Other Counsel, No. 18
(emphasis added).
120. See e.g., Marilyn Lindgren Cohen, A Case for Civility.: Some Good Reasons
Lawyers Need to Show a Little Common Courtesy, Or. St. B. Bull. 33, AugiSept. 1995,
at 33, 33.
121. George W. Warve~le, Essays in Legal Ethics § 316 (1920).
122. See Fox v. Mellon, 264 A.2d 623, 627 (Pa. 1970) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting)
(arguing that trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside default, but
that, in light of professional courtesy, "[h]ad there been counsel for defendant in the
picture here, even informally, the case would be entirely different.").
123. Cf. Seabrook Med. Sys., Inc. v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 164 F.R.D. 232,233
(S.D. Ohio 1995) ("[Als a matter of professional courtesy, and as a means to avoid
future scheduling conflicts... counsel for both sides should jointly call the third-party
deponent to schedule that party's deposition.... [Or] counsel for both sides should
contact each other and jointly agree to a deposition date. Only then should the
deposition subpoena issue. What needs to occur is quite simple: counsel should
discuss and agree to a deposition date before the issuance of the subpoena, not
after."); John Caher, Attorney Sanction for Ex ParteOrder Reversed, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
21, 2000, at 1 (reporting on the reversal of a sanction against an attorney who
obtained an ex parte order in a custody matter, despite seeing opposing counsel at the
courthouse, which, according to the court in In re Matter of Frank -M" v. Siobahn
"N", 702 N.Y.S.2d 409 (App. Div. 2000) showed a lack of professional courtesy but
did not merit sanction).
124. See Graydon v. Stokes, 24 S.C. 483, 486 (1886) (acknowledging local
"courtesy" in certain localities in regard to services between attorneys, but finding
that "the moment the parties, from any cause whatever, stand upon their rights, there
can be no such thing as courtesy in the case"); Warvelle, supra note 121, § 322
(acknowledging that attorneys should not charge for slight services to one another).
125. Warvelle, supra note 121, § 316.
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continued that "in the few cases where bar associations have ventured
to express an opinion it has generally been left in the discretion of
counsel. 126 Warvelle also noted that, although it is counsel's province
to make procedural decisions,127 the client also has the "right to have
his cause tried at the time set; to have adverse pleadings filed within
the time allowed; and to insist that his attorney shall take every legal
advantage the case may afford." 1 8 This succinct statement of
contrasting responsibilities raises the same question today: 29 To what
extent should the virtues of professional courtesy mitigate the duty of
zealous advocacy to the client?'
Canon 25 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted by the
American Bar Association in 1908, styled the matter as one of "taking
technical advantage" of one's opponent.3
The Canons treated
observing known customs together with honoring oral agreements
with opposing counsel.
This identifies one strain of court
disapproval for taking defaults-that there is an implicit
misrepresentation involved when one attorney does not inform
another of an impending default.133 This implicit affirmative duty
contrasts with the lack of any duty to inform opposing counsel, for
instance, that a claim being negotiated for settlement is actually
barred by the statute of limitations."
126. Id.
127. See Canons of Prof'1 Ethics Canon 24 (1908) (Right of Lawyer to Control the
Incidents of the Trial).
128. Warvelle, supra note 121, § 317.
129. Balance between zeal and duties to the court and colleagues has long occupied
the bar. See David Hoffman, A Course of Legal Study 752 (1836) ("I will never
permit professional zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum .....
130. See supra Part II.B.
131. See Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 25 (1908) (Taking Technical Advantage of
Opposite Counsel; Agreements With Him).
132. Id.
133. The misrepresentation at issue in Canon 25 is whether or not a particular
custom will be followed. When the custom is not to take a default, despite its
availability under the rules, deviating requires notice. See Canons of Profl Ethics
Canon 25 (1908); Fox v. Mellon, 264 A.2d 623, 627 (Pa. 1970) (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting); see also Nev. Indus. Guar. Co. v. Sturgeon, 391 P.2d 862, 865 (Nev. 1964)
(Thompson, J., concurring) (finding no conflict between duty to client and the duty to
inform opponent of "an honest statement of intention" to seek a default.)
134. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 387 (1994).
This opinion finds no duty of candor, barring any affirmative misrepresentation.
Filing a suit knowing it is barred by the statute of limitations is not an ethical
violation. Id. pt. II. ("[T]he whole point of an adversarial system is that parties are
entitled to harvest whatever windfalls they can from the miscues or odd judgments of
their opponents" (quoting Hazard & Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, § 3.1:204-2 (1992
Supp.))); ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 694 (1963) (citing the duty
under Canon 15 to assert "every remedy" and put opponent's defense to the test, who
may for some reason not wish to raise it); Fox, 264 A.2d at 627-28 (Pomeroy, J.,
dissenting) (noting that limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived).
This is a long way from Hoffman's Resolutions in Regard to ProfessionalDeportment.
Resolution XII provided "I will never plead the Statute of Limitations... for if my
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D. Courtesy in Modern Ethics Codes
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility was drafted after
the "general aspirational approach of the Canons proved to be
outmoded."' "s The Code is primarily a mix of mandatory
"Disciplinary Rules" and aspirational "Ethical Considerations.""
Canon 25 was directly incorporated in the provisions of Canon 7, both
as mandatory and aspirational.' 37 The Code's division resulted in
some confusion about the force of these aspirational principles. Some
of the aspirational standards, for example, could serve just as well as
prescriptive rules, and the converse is true for some of the mandatory
standards.'
After the Model Code was developed, some
jurisdictions, wary of confusing binding and non-binding obligations,
adopted only the Disciplinary Rules.139
Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires
that a lawyer should "represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law."' Ethical Consideration ("EC") 7-10 provides that zeal does
not reduce a lawyer's
"concurrent obligation" to treat others with
"consideration.""14 EC 7-38 advises that a lawyer should be courteous,
and should agree to reasonable requests that do not impair a client's
interests. 42 Tracking the language of the Ethical Considerations,
Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-101 indicates, in the negative, that a
lawyer does not fail to act zealously by avoiding "offensive tactics"
and embracing "courtesy.' 4 3 More clearly, DR 7-106(C)(5) mandates
that a lawyer shall not "fail to comply with known local customs of
courtesy" without proper noticeY1' This provision was not cairied
over into the Model Rules, as it was found to be "too vague to be a

client is conscious he owes the debt.., he shall never make me a partner in his
knavery." Hoffman, supra note 129, at 754.
135. Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes 494 (John S.
Dzienkowski ed., 1999).
136. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983).
137. See Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canon 7, EC 7-38, DR 7-106(C)(5)
(1983), reprintedin Dzienkowski, supra note 135, at 464 n.64, 468 n.84. The footnotes
in the original ABA Model Code cite Canon 25 for the provisions in EC 7-38 and DR
7-106(C)(5), although the footnotes are not intended to indicate Committee intent.
Id. at 385 n.1.
138. See Wolfram, supra note 15, § 2.6, at 58-59; see eg., Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility EC 7-4 ("[A] lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation
that is frivolous.").
139. See Wolfram, supra note 15, § 2.6, at 58 n.54. Wolfram presumes that the
decision to make a standard binding or non-binding reflected its questionable wisdom
or difficulty in application. Id. § 2.6, at 59 n.58.
140. Model Code of Prof'l Responsibility Canon 7, EC 7-1 (1983). The references
to "EC" or "DR" that follow are to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
141. Id. at EC 7-10.
142 Id. at EC 7-38.
143. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1).
144. Id. at DR 7-106(C)(5).
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rule of conduct enforceable as law." '45 Courts in Rule states 46 have
read a requirement of professional courtesy into Rule 8.4(d),
however, finding that failing to act with professional courtesy is
"prejudicial to the administration of justice."'47
In what appears to be the most thorough treatment of DR 7106(C)(5) in the case law, the Supreme Court of Oregon developed a
detailed interpretation of "known local customs of courtesy." 4 8 The
court increased a recommended thirty-day suspension from practice
to sixty-three days for "the worst sort of sharp practice.'

49

Attorney

Porter, the court agreed, misrepresented to opposing counsel that he
would not seek a default, by a letter stating: "I anticipate no problems
in allowing extra time for your appearance."' 50 Six weeks later, Porter
sought and received entry of default, then unsuccessfully
resisted
5
when defendant immediately moved to set it aside.1 '
Finding a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3)'s prohibition of "conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation," the court
then explored DR 7-106(C)(5), noting that "the accused's
misrepresentation so overshadows any finding that we might make as
145. Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 3.4 (Model Code Comparison 5) (1983).
Several cases show the difficulty of proving a "local custom of courtesy." See In re
Schiff. 542 S.W.2d 771, 775 (Mo. 1976) (upholding discipline for deceit but deeming
the testimony of several attorneys about the practice of notice before taking default
judgments "equivocal" and refusing to find violation of DR 7-106(C)(5)); Inv.
Bankers of Am., Inc. v. Schools, 178 A.2d 325, 326 (D.C. 1962) (stating "[w]e know of
no rule that required plaintiffs attorney to notify defendant's attorney that default
judgment had been taken... [and] while professional courtesy might have suggested
[it], he was under no duty to do so"); see also Seabrook Med. Sys., Inc. v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 164 F.R.D. 232, 233 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting that "[t]he Court has
no way of knowing whether such calls [to coordinate scheduling depositions] are, in
fact, routine practice, but believes they should be in this and all other cases"). The
Model Rules similarly did not retain the Code's exhortation to avoid "offensive
tactics" while zealously advancing the client's interests. See Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility DR 7-101(A)(1), EC 7-37 (1983).
146. About forty-one states have adopted (and adapted) the Model Rules. See
Daly, supra note 11, at 1137 n.87 (citing Laws. Manual on Prof'l Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 01:03-01:04 (1999)).
147. Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 n.7 (Ind. 1999) (citing Grun v.
Pneurno Abex Corp., 163 F.3d 411, 422 n.9 (7th Cir. 1998)). In Gnin, the court
disapproved of counsel's failure to notify his opponent that the court had entered a
dismissal after both failed to appear, despite knowing that his opponent was unaware
of the dismissal. Grun, 163 F.3d at 422 n.9. The court looked to the spirit of fair play
in Duty 18 of the Seventh Circuit's Standards for Professional Conduct as well as
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4. See also N. Cent. Ill. Laborers' Dist. Council v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 842 F.2d 164, 169 n.10 (7th Cir. 1988) ("We do not condone
North Central's decision not to extend Mr. Kaplan the professional courtesy of
notifying him of the default hearing."); Passarella v. Hilton Int'l Co., 810 F.2d 674, 677
(7th Cir. 1987) (criticizing failure to extend professional courtesy of providing notice
of a default hearing in Rule 60(b)(1) context).
148. In re Porter, 890 P.2d 1377, 1382-86 (Or. 1995).
149. Id. at 1381, 1387.
150. Id. at 1380.
151. Id.

2000]

ENFORCING COURTESY

to this charge."1 " The court squarely addressed Porter's argument
that compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was a
defense against the ethics charge."t Indeed, it is clear that Canon 7
sets out limits on "zealous advocacy," and while there is substantial
overlap with rules of procedure and evidence, the Model Code stands
as "a separate source of applicable substantive law."'" The court
described how Oregon's ethical standards began as "customs of
courtesy and practice" because "[t]here was nothing else" before the
first state adopted a code of ethics in 1881, and the ABA provided the
"Canons of Professional Ethics" in 1908.115 In 1935, Oregon adopted
the "Rules of Professional Conduct of the Oregon State Bar," which
included Rule 29, providing in part that "[a] member of the state bar
shall not ignore known customs or practices of the bar of a particular
court, even when 1the
law permits, without giving timely notice to
56
opposing counsel.
The court also found a continuity of disapproval of defaults sought
without notice, citing precedent" which accepted the Code of Trial
Conduct of the American College of Trial Lawyers, provision 14(a),5S
requiring notice to the opposing party when the identity of the lawyer
is known. 59 In Porter's defense," the court gave no weight in its
historical review, including its review of Oregon cases, to the
difference between the state procedural rule and the federal. 161
Oregon procedure, which does not separate entry from judgment,
requires notice before a default judgment if the party had filed an
152. Id. at 1382.

153. See id.
154. Id.

155. Id. at 1383.
156. Id.; see also Andrew R.Herron, Comment, Collegiality, Justice,and the Public
Image: Why One Lawyer's Pleasureis Another's Poison, 44 U. Miami L Rev. 807,819

n.60 (1990) (quoting Canons of Professional Ethics). Canon 25 provides:
Taking Technical Advantage of Opposite Counsel; Agreements with Him.
A lawyer should not ignore known customs or practice of the Bar or of a
particular Court, even when the law permits, without giving timely notice to
the opposing counsel. As far as possible, important agreements, affecting
the rights of clients, should be reduced to writing; but it is dishonorable to
avoid performance of an agreement fairly made because it is not reduced to
writing, as required by rules of Court.
Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 25 (1908).
157. See Porter,890 P.2d at 1383 (citing Ainsworth v. Dunham, 384 P.2d 214 (Or.

1963)).
158. See supra note 85.
159. See Porter,890 P.2d at 1383.
160. For Porter's self-defense, see Charles 0. Porter, Letters, Or. St. B. Bull., Dec.

1995, at 5, 5-6 (noting that the case went to a hearing as a result of Porter's refusal to
stipulate to a public reprimand, and maintaining the issue was "whether I complied
with the rules, not with the optional customs of courtesy"). Porter was writing, in
part, in response to Marilyn Lindgren Cohen, A Case for Civilit: Some Good
Reasons Lawyers Need to Show a Little Common Courtesy, Or. St. B. Bull.,
Aug.Sept. 1995, at 33, 33 (reporting on the Portercase).
161. The underlying litigation at issue in Porterwas filed in federal court.
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appearance or a written intent to do so. 162 The federal rule allows

entry of default without notice, and only requires notice before
judgment if an appearance has been made, or damages are
unliquidated.163
As to the question of whether a "custom" existed, the court looked
to how courts determine "customs" in other "trades."' 6 The court
found that "a custom is a particular course of acting or dealing so
general and uniform that it has taken on the status of an unwritten law
governing practitioners in a particular community" such that "no
person of ordinary intelligence..,
who exercises reasonable care
' 65
would be ignorant of it.'

Porteris remarkable, as one commentator noted,1' 6 in its attempt to
give new life to a moribund provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; one that was deleted from the Model Rules as
unenforceable unenforceable. The case is also remarkable for its
severity. The court exceeded the recommendation of the state bar
and imposed a sixty-three day suspension. Although in part due to
previous discipline, this seems strong punishment. After all, the
misrepresentation at issue amounted to one phrase, allegedly
calculated to lull the defendant into a default that was not taken for
six weeks. 167

The court's method of determining a "custom" in the practice of
law is also problematic. While it improves upon merely declaring that
a practice is a custom, as a justice of the Nevada Supreme Court
announced,' 61 the diversity of practice in the legal profession is vast.
In Porter,the court was clear that it was not disciplining Mr. Porter for
violation of a custom, but for his misrepresentation. 169 It is important
to note the distinction between a "custom" and "an agreement or
understanding between opposing attorneys that a default will not be
taken without notice.' 17 However, in a number of cases, these
162. See Or. R. Civ. P. 69(A).
163. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b)(1)-(2); supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
164. Porter,890 P.2d at 1385.
165. Id. (citation omitted). On the importance of these sorts of "unwritten
customs" and their relevance to clinical education, see Seielstad, supra note 98, at
152-54 (noting that Porter "purports to breathe new life into unwritten customs of
courtesy and practice that preceded the adoption of written codes of ethics or rules of
civil procedure" and discussing the theoretical implications of such "local legal
culture"). One positive view of civility codes sees them as educational, hoping to
change behavior by clarifying norms and spelling out the unwritten rules of the
profession. See Aaronson, supra note 82, at 115.
166. See Seielstad, supra note 98, at 154.
167. See Porter,890 P.2d at 1381.
168. See Nev. Indus. Guar. Co. v. Sturgeon, 391 P.2d 862, 864 (Nev. 1964)
(Thompson, J., concurring) (declaring that "[i]t is the practice among members of the
Nevada Bar for an attorney, who knows that a defaulting adverse party is represented
by counsel in the pending case, to give notice of intention to have default entered").
169. See Porter,890 P.2d at 1382.
170. J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Failure to Give Notice of Application for Default
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questions are bound up together.17 Indeed, Canon 25 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics conceives of the problem together'7
In
addition, often there is a gray area when informal agreements are
made. 173
III. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT: BETTER WAYS TO INTERPRET AND
ENFORCE PROCEDURAL RULES

This part further examines the law of default judgments and how
other courts have responded to concerns about defaults, both directly
and indirectly. Courts have developed simple and effective ways to
curtail the practice of default judgments. This organic process is likely
to be more effective than simple requests in the form of non-binding
codes and creeds.
A. Defining Appearance and Excusable Neglect Liberally
Developments in the law of default judgments show steady
evolution of increasingly flexible standards that favor allowing matters
to be heard on their merits. The sum of this trend makes taking
defaults under some circumstances simply untenable. Indeed, in light
of the developing law, defaults under some circumstances amount to a
frivolous litigation position, sanctionable by well-established ethics
codes, court rules, statutes, and the court's inherent authority. 74
1. Appearance
The Florida courts have read professional courtesy into the rules for
obtaining defaults, setting them aside when notice has not been
provided even though not required by those procedural rules.'7 5
Florida Rules of Court require notice of an application for default

Judgment Where Notice Is Required Only By Custom, 28 A.L.R. 3d 1383 (1969).
171. See eg., Bernath v. Wilson, 309 P.2d 87, 89 (Cal. Dist. Ct.App. 1957) (finding

plaintiffs counsel acted "contrary to his agreement and understanding" extending
time to respond to opposing counsel, and contrary to custom).
172. See Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 24 (1908).
173. See Cahaley v. Cahaley, 12 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn. 1943) ("If an agreement

between attorneys for an extension of time has been made which is indefinite in its
terms, such an understanding should not be construed by counsel technically or
strictly in the taking of a default judgment so as to deprive a party unjustly of his

rights, but rather in the spirit of professional courtesy and mutual helpfulness.").
174. See Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 3.1 (1999) (Meritorious Claims and

Contentions); supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
175. See Sklar v. Brawley, 651 So. 2d 1314, 1314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
(reversing failure to set aside default since plaintiff knew by opposing counsel's
"communicat[ions]" that he intended to defend); Ole, Inc. v. Yariv, 566 So. 2d 812,
814 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (setting aside default when plaintiff had actual

knowledge that opposing counsel intended to defend, despite failure to answer or
serve any papers in the matter).
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76
only when the party has filed or served any papers in the action.
Florida courts have construed "any papers" more liberally than the
"appearance" that triggers the requirement for notice under the
federal rules."7
The liberal standard for requiring notice evolved first from a broad
definition of "file or serve any paper" to include letters not filed with
a court, or even drafted by an attorney. 178 From this expansive
definition, in Gulf Maintenance & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, the
appellate court held "[i]t follows that notice of an application for
default should always be served when the plaintiff is aware that a
defendant is being represented by
counsel who has expressed an
1 79
intention to defend on the merits.'
The connection from procedural to ethical standards was completed
when the court took note of the Code of Trial Conduct adopted by the
American College of Trial Lawyers.'
The court also repeated the

Florida Supreme Court's declaration that "the true purpose... of a

default is to speed the cause," not to award judgment "without the
difficulty that arises from a contest."'' Federal courts have liberalized
the definition of the "appearance" necessary to trigger the rule's
notice provisions since a leading case in

1 9 7 0 1i

accepted letters

between counsel as an "appearance" that communicated the
defendant's "purpose to defend" the suit."m
Aside from the pronouncements in civility codes, the law of defaults
has been increasingly liberalized. There has been greater and more
easily obtainable relief from the harshness of defaults, allowing for
surer invalidation of entry and judgment. This standard more fully
implements the aim of modern procedural rules that encourage
matters to be heard on their merits, not through highly technical
pleading.

176. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(b).
177. Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

178. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a)-(b); Gulf Maint. & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank,
543 So. 2d 813, 816-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
179. Gulf Maint. & Supply, 543 So. 2d at 816.
180. See id. at 816 n.3; supra note 18.
181. Gulf Maint. & Supply, 543 So. 2d at 816 (quoting Coggin v. Barfield, 8 So. 2d
9, 11 (Fla. 1942)).
182. See H.F. Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d
689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
183. Id. at 691-92. But see N. Cent. Ill. Laborers' Dist. Council v. S.J. Groves &
Sons Co., 842 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir. 1988) (declining to follow Livermore definition
of appearance for notice requirement); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Crowder, 547 So. 2d 876,
879 (Ala. 1989) (declining to follow federal precedent, despite identical rules, and
holding that something must be filed with the court, refusing to give attorneys
"authority to enlarge the time for answering a complaint without some filing, as
meager as it might be, with the court").
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2. Excusable Neglect
New, more liberal standards for relief from judgment may also be
used to set aside defaults taken without "courtesy" notice more easily.
Such liberalization further diminishes any potential advantage that
"snap judgments" may offer.
In Pioneer Investment Service Co. v. Brunswick Associates, the
Supreme Court adopted a broad definition of "excusable neglect."'
The Court acted in the bankruptcy context, but discussed the
operation of the same standard within Rule 60(b)(1), providing for
relief from judgment." The Court noted that "for purposes of Rule
60(b), 'excusable neglect' is understood to encompass situations in
which the failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to
negligence."'"
To reach its conclusion, the Court looked to dictionary definitions
of what constitutes "neglect."'8 Rejecting the "narrow view""t that
required some conduct out of the party's control as an excuse, the
Court found the standard permitted "inadvertence, mistake, or
carelessness" as well.189 After finding that a party's omission resulted
from neglect, Pioneer directs only that a court engage in a
"determination [that] is at bottom an equitable one, taking account of
all relevant circumstances" to determine whether the neglect is
excusable. 90
The dissent in Pioneer objected that decoupling "excusable" from
"neglect" drained the meaning from the phrase.191 While not explicit,
in practice the Pioneerstandard will offer relief for all conduct except
deliberate or "willful" delay."9 The less restrictive standard will allow
more ready relief in a number of default judgments that begin as
rather ordinary mistakes in the transmission of process. While relief
from defaults taken in circumstances implicating "professional
184. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc., 507 U.S. 380, 380 (1993).
185. Id. at 393. The Court based its decision on the plain meaning of "excusable
neglect," which is used in a number of contexts. Id. at 391-94 (discussing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(b), 13(0, 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)); see also Advanced
Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1996) (joining other
circuits in applying the Pioneer definition to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) and 4(b), rules
governing time for filing appeals).
186. Pioneer,507 U.S. at 394.
187. Id. at 388.
188. Id. at 387 n.3.
189. Id. at 388.
190. Id. at 395.
191. See id. at 403-04 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192. For a description of the "liberal" and "strict" standards used by the circuit
courts of appeal before Pioneer, see Brett Warren Weathersbee, Note, No More
Excuses: Refusing to Condone Mere Carelessness or Negligence under the "Excusable
Neglect" Standardin FederalRule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), 50 Vand. L Rev 1619,
1624-31 (1997). The liberal standard allowed relief for all but willful or culpable
conduct, while the strict insisted on something more than carelessness. Id.
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courtesy" were often set aside before, Pioneer further lowers the
standard.
B. Reforming DefaultProcedure:An Example from Pennsylvania"9
Pennsylvania has dealt with the issue of providing notice before
taking defaults directly by amending its procedural rules to require at
least ten days notice of intent to seek a default judgment. The frank
194
explanatory statement that accompanies the rule is comprehensive.
The rule clearly aims to avoid the problems of "snap judgments."' 19 It
provides for notice to the party and counsel in order to account for
both the sometimes inevitable "delays in transmittal of process"
(when insurers are involved, for instance) and for the "salutary effect"
of notice to the client upon -a "dilatory attorney.""9 The rule provides
for notice to parties, whether represented by counsel or not. 197 In fact,
the form of notice is calculated to alert the unrepresented litigant with
explicit, all-caps warnings of the impending default, as well as the
admonition: "YOU SHOULD TAKE THIS NOTICE TO A
LAWYER AT ONCE. 198 The warnings are intended to "stem the
tide of petitions to open default judgments." 99
Finally, the rule squarely addresses the practice of professional
courtesy. 2°° First, the rule cannot be waived.2°' Second, operation of
the rule eliminates the need for most extensions of time since, before
the required
notice of intention to seek default, "there is no event to
' 202
postpone.
The provision governing attorneys who grant each other extensions
of time was amended in 1994.203 The rule's first amendment, effective
in 1980, had allowed an exception to the notice requirement when the
parties had agreed upon an extension in writing.2°4 That writing could
193. Arizona similarly amended its rules for application and entry of default.
These provide for ten days notice to a party or a party's attorney, if known, whether
or not that attorney has appeared. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A default does not
become effective if the party defends within those ten days, effectively extending the
time for answer. Corbet v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 383, 385 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
194. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1, explanatory cmt. (1994).
195. The pun is popular in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Smith v. Goschenhoppen-Home
Ins. Group, No. CIV.A. 97-2034, 1998 WL 721082, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1998);
Farrell v. Bd. of Tr. of Soc. Sec. Fund, 269 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa. 1970); Carson Pirie Scott
& Co. v. Phillips, 434 A.2d 790, 791-92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); Wentzell v. Cooper, 74
A.2d 693, 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1950).
196. Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1 explanatory cmt. (1994).
197. Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1.
198. Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.4-5.
199. Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1 explanatory cmt. (1994).

200. See id.

201. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1(a)(4).
202. Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.1 explanatory cmt. (1994).
203. See Flynn v. Casa Di Bertacchi Corp., 674 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1996) (discussing 1994 amendment providing for use of form for extensions of time).
204. See Johnson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 570 A.2d 71, 72-73 (Pa. 1990)
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substitute as proof of notice after its agreed time expired.'
The
comment to the earlier rule noted that, if the language of the
correspondence was "couched in general language" without a fixed
date, notice under the rule would still be required.2 0
The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out that this part -of the rule was
"intended as a sort of procedural statute of frauds."
Nonetheless,
within this narrow exception, disputes still arose.2u The amended rule
eliminated the exception and substituted a simple form to provide for
definite agreements. 2w
In fact, the formal agreements provided by the rule are only
available after notice of intent to seek a judgment. t0 While parties
will likely reach informal agreements-of the sort that often lead to
contest later, or are subject to manipulation or misrepresentationthey are now wholly irrelevant to the court.
The effect of this revised rule is clearer than applying ideas about
cooperation, civility, implied misrepresentations, or custom. The rule,
unfettered by antiquated notions of professional courtesy, also applies
equally to all parties-even non-lawyers.
C. Keeping Away from Courtesy
Widespread civility codes that include provisions proscribing the
use of defaults are marked by a look backwards-to a time when
"taking technical advantage" of one's opponent meant something very
different. 21 1 This nostalgia conflicts with the evolution of the
regulation of lawyers, which has largely been moving away from
listing aspirational precepts, and toward more enforceable rules. One
commentator has thus called civility codes an example of "reverse
'
evolution."212

The history of the provision regarding professional

courtesy illustrates this backward look.'
There are more powerful alternatives to civility codes already used
directly by courts to regulate default judgments. Trying to legislate
(quoting text of earlier rule); see also Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Phillips, 434 A.2d
790, 791 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (discussing the amendment and its purpose to
"ameliorate the inequities which oft times inured" due to "snap judgments").
205. See Johnson, 570 A.2d at 72-73.
206. Id. at 73.
207. Id. at 74.
208. See id

209. See Pa. R Civ. P. 237.6.
210. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 237.2 explanatory cmt. (1994).
211. See Canons of Prof'l Ethics Canon 25 (1908).
212. Mashburn, supra note 12, at 683-84.

213. See, e.g., W. Va. Standards of Prof'l Conduct, Preamble ("Society at this time
seems to be accepting a fundamental loss of common courtesy as a trend that

accompanies the fast-paced existence most Americans now live. Perhaps instant
communication, in which more information needs to be assimilated more rapidly, has
rendered thoughtfulness nearly impossible. Perhaps it is simply the cynicism inherent

in a society that values winning at all costs.").
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and enforce courtesy may be inherently illogical- courtesy is a matter
of social or professional grace that cannot be legislated.
"Professional" courtesy cannot somehow become "common" through
mere repetition; customs are not easily declared.
One meaning of courtesy, the one at work in the phrase
"professional courtesy," is "indulgence," an "agreement in spite of
fact." 2 14 Contrast this with the simple meaning accorded default: "By
its derivation, a failure. An omission of that which ought to be
'
done."215
Default is the failure to do what is necessary; a courtesy is
doing something that isn't.
Civility codes lose sight of this easy distinction, the difference
between unspoken graces and enforced manners. The codes threaten
to ignore alternatives such as increased enforcement of existing
disciplinary rules 216 and amendments to rules of procedure. 217 They

threaten to redirect energy away from investigating more substantive
causes of lawyer dissatisfaction. Civility codes also pass over potential
conflicts with the duty of lawyers to represent their clients zealously.
Defaults without notice may offend, but lawyers may be disciplined
for lack of218diligence if they don't seek to secure entry of default
eventually.

Civility codes fail to consider rule changes that would be simple to

214. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (3d ed. 1992)
("2.a. Consent or agreement in spite of fact; indulgence: They call this pond a lake by
courtesy only."); Graydon v. Stokes, 24 S.C. 483, 486 (1886) ("The very fact that it is
called a courtesy indicates that making no charge is exceptional, and that the general
rule is to charge.")
215. Black's Law Dictionary 417 (6th ed. 1990).
216. See Mashburn, supra note 12, at 684 ("One wonders why civility advocates
gave up on mechanisms that are already in place in favor of new, symbolic codes.")
217. See Moliterno, supra note 2, at 800. Professor Moliterno has argued similarly:
Aspirational creeds should not be used to police lawyer conduct that
complies with the language of procedural rules such as... default judgment
rules ....If a currently authorized practice, such as moving for default
judgment when no answer has been timely filed or moving to strike a latefiled brief, ought rather to be prohibited, then the procedural rules should
themselves be amended to reflect the measure of diligence with which
lawyers should be expected to enforce violations.
218. See Morse v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 961 S.W.2d 798, 798 (Ky. 1998); Baker v. Ky. Bar
Ass'n, 935 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1996); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Komarek, 702 N.E.2d
62, 66-67 (Ohio 1998). Of course, attorneys are more likely to be disciplined for lack
of diligence when their conduct results in defaults entered against their clients. See In
the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Broadnax, 559 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Wis.
1997) (upholding 90-day suspension for, inter alia, neglect of client matters). These
cases demonstrate a cynical reason to encourage lawyers to stick by each other: When
a client loses by an attorney's default, that lawyer will likely be responsible to the
client for malpractice. See, e.g., Curran v. James Regulator Co., 36 A.2d 187, 189 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1944) (decrying counsel's "lack of that professional spirit which.., if not
thwarted, might subject a reputable member of the bar to liability to his client for a
large sum of money").
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effect, nor note where they have already been implemented.2 19 Since
civility codes overlap with existing codes and rules,2- civility codes
divert attention from other concerns. 2 ' Siren calls for more civility
enforced by code should be considered more thoughtfully and
ultimately resisted.
CONCLUSION

As one writer has noted, "[p]arity in representation would in time
affect lawyers' conduct, tempering excessive zeal more effectively
than pleas for ethical self-restraint ever will."22 The writer continues:
Trial lawyers make easy targets. But are they less moral than
journalists-or other professionals? In this era of doubts and
disillusionments about the ability of American institutions of all
kinds to promote human well-being, who in a position of trust has a
conscience free of moral conflicts? Every occupation has longstanding troubles its practitioners must face if they are to reach
beyond narrow craft standards and self-interest to act for the larger
good3.2
Civility codes, despite their rhetoric, too often focus on narrow
"craft" standards-such as when to forbear seeking a default
judgment. When this prohibition is examined closely, it appears
rooted in a reflexive nostalgia. Advocates of greater civility should
offer, rather than simple pleas, straightforward procedural reforms
that benefit both lawyers and the unrepresented.

219. The rule changes described above, in Arizona and Pennsylvania, precede the
wave of civility codes. See notes 193,204 and accompanying text.
220. Even in Texas, where the "Texas Lawyer's Creed" is mandatory, discovery
rules were recently amended after ten years of the Creed aimed at the same abuses.
Some of the rule changes prohibit deposition misconduct, such as witness coaching,
which was also a subject of the Texas Lawyer's Creed. Compare Tex. R. Civ. P. 199
(prohibiting deposition misconduct by court rule) with Texas Lawyer's Creed
(prohibiting same as a matter of creed). See Alyson Nelson, Comment, Deposition
Conduct: Texas's New Discovery Rules End Up Taking Another Jab at the Rambos of
Litigation, 30 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1471, 1496-98 (1999) (noting that the recent rule
amendment will lessen the confusion about standards that might result from
proceedings subject both to locally enacted, aspirational standards of civility and the
state-wide creed).
221. See Mashburn, supra note 12, at 661 (contending that -legal trade journals
reveal[ an almost obsessive focus upon the behavior of lawyers to the virtual
exclusion of all other social, cultural, historical, and economic" concerns).
222. Sam Schrager, The Trial Lawyer's Art 218 (1999).
223. Id. at 221.
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